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The three main assertion-based verification approaches are: Run-time Assertion Checking (RAC), 
Extended Static Checking (ESC) and Full Formal Verification (FFV). Each approach offers a 
different balance between rigour and ease of use, making them appropriate in different situations. 
Our goal is to explore the use of these approaches together in a flexible way, enabling an 
application to be broken down into parts with different reliability requirements and different 
verification approaches used in each part. We explain the benefits of using the approaches 
together, present a set of guidelines to avoid potential conflicts and give an overview of how the 
Omnibus IDE provides support for the full range of assertion-based verification approaches 
within a single tool. 
1. Introduction 
There are three assertion-based techniques for the integrated specification, 
implementation and verification of Object-Oriented software: Run-time Assertion 
Checking (RAC) [12], Extended Static Checking (ESC) [10] and Full Formal 
Verification (FFV) [4]. RAC and ESC are lightweight approaches which accept 
programs annotated with lightweight specifications that describe some key 
properties, but do not attempt to be complete in any sense. In RAC, the 
lightweight assertion annotations are converted into run-time checks and the 
application is then tested to uncover assertion failures. The key contribution of 
RAC to the testing process is the ability to detect errors close to their source, 
easing analysis and correction. In ESC, the consistency between code and 
assertion annotations is checked statically allowing errors to be detected without 
testing. The process depends on the presence of a powerful fully-automated 
theorem prover such as Simplify [5]. ESC is neither sound nor complete, aiming 
simply to detect assertion violations and a range of common run-time errors. FFV 
provides support for traditional, heavyweight assertion-based verification. The 
approach requires the production of heavyweight specifications (also known as 
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Behavioural Interface Specifications) for all components being verified and a 
range of code annotations such as loop invariants. Again, the code is statically 
analysed and verification is performed with the use of either a fully-automated or 
interactive theorem prover. 
Traditionally, support for these approaches has been developed by separate teams, 
yielding separate tools often targeting separate languages. The Java Modelling 
Language (JML) [9] has provided a common language for a range of lightweight 
and heavyweight assertion-based verification tools but those tools are still 
developed and used separately. Even comparative case studies from the JML 
group have used the tools independently rather than in an integrated fashion [8]. 
Other tools such as Spec# [1] and PerfectDeveloper [4] combine aspects of RAC 
and FFV but until now there has been no tool supporting the full range of 
approaches in an integrated fashion. 
Such a tool is desirable since the different assertion-based verification approaches 
provide different balances between rigour and ease of use, matching the different 
balances between reliability requirements and development resources in different 
parts of a software development project. The approaches also have neatly 
complementing strengths and weaknesses. The lightweight RAC and ESC 
approaches allow reliability to be improved without requiring prohibitive 
investments in time and effort, but ESC breaks down somewhat in the presence of 
external components and RAC requires the use of testing to uncover failures. In 
contrast, FFV is capable of sufficiently describing and statically verifying external 
components but its costs cannot typically be justified unless the component is 
going to be reused in different projects or reliability is critical. 
We are interested in allowing the approaches to be used together in an integrated 
fashion within different parts of the same project. We will show, using an 
example, how using the approaches together is helpful for verification, identify 
some key challenges in using the approaches together and present sets of 
guidelines to assist the user in selecting the right approach for each section of the 
project and avoiding conflicts between the approaches. We will also outline a 
range of ways in which the approaches can be configured, from simply adjusting 
the range of checks that are performed to strategies for handling constructs that 
cannot be converted to efficient run-time checks or cannot be handled by the 
corresponding theorem prover. 
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We have developed a new Object-Oriented language called Omnibus [16,18,19] 
designed to be superficially quite similar to Java but easier to reason about 
formally. The main simplification made by the language is the use of value 
semantics by default for objects. The language is supported by the Omnibus 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) which includes file and project 
management facilities, a type checker, a documentation generator, a Java code 
generator incorporating support for dynamic assertion checks, a unit testing 
framework and a static verifier which supports interactive and automatic 
verification. 
The examples in this paper are presented in the Omnibus language but the ideas 
we discuss could be equally well applied to approaches based on other languages 
such as JML. We also used ESC/Java2 [3] to test Java equivalents of the Omnibus 
ESC examples. 
The Omnibus IDE allows developers to define verification policies and assign 
different policies to each file in a project. The built-in policies are RAC, ESC and 
FFV along with a number of variations, but the user can easily customize or 
extend these to create a verification framework to meet their exact needs. The 
code generator and static verifier modules then use these settings to guide them. 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Omnibus language. Section 3 explains why 
and how the different assertion-based verification approaches can be used 
together. Section 4 discusses some problems that arise in combining the 
approaches and gives guidelines to help to avoid these problems. Section 5 
presents recommendations on how to choose a verification policy for an 
application. Section 6 discusses some useful ways in which the Omnibus IDE 
allows the verification approaches to be configured. Section 7 presents a brief 
overview of the Verification Policy Manager tool. Section 8 discusses related 
work and Section 9 presents some conclusions and future work. 
2. The Omnibus Language 
Omnibus is a new Object-Oriented language designed to be amenable to formal 
analysis [16]. It is superficially similar to Java, using similar concepts of 
packages, classes, methods, expressions, statements etc, but incorporates a 
behavioural interface specification language and uses value semantics for objects. 
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The use of value semantics by default removes the need for developers to use a 
range of complex annotations to marshal the complexities of reference semantics. 
An Omnibus application consists of a set of class definitions. Each class contains 
a range of methods for manipulating instances of the class. There are three main 
types of method declaration: constructors, functions and operations. Constructors 
allow objects to be created, functions allow objects to be queried without side-
effects and operations allow objects to be updated. The declaration of a method 
starts with a keyword identifying the type of method. Constructors are class 
methods whereas functions and operations are object methods. 
In Omnibus, all objects are immutable with the system creating new objects 
behind the scenes as needed to preserve value semantics. This is hidden from the 
programmers who are allowed to think in terms of updating objects. There is a 
single equality operator which represents deep equality. In deep equality, two 
objects are equal if they are instances of the same class and all the corresponding 
elements of their abstract state are (recursively) equal. 
Behaviour specifications: The behaviour of methods can be described using 
behaviour specifications which are constructed from requires, changes and 
ensures clauses which give pre-conditions, frame conditions and post-
conditions, respectively. A subset of the functions in the class is taken to represent 
the abstract state of the class. These functions are called model functions, and are 
similar in concept to the base functions of Eiffel [12]. They are declared with the 
model modifier and do not have post-conditions. The behaviour of the other 
methods (the remaining functions along with the constructors and operations) is 
then defined in terms of them. When specifying operations, the changes clause 
should be used to describe which model functions have their values changed and 
the ensures clause should be used to describe how they are changed. 
Method calls can be used within specifications and other assertions but where they 
are used, the pre-conditions of the called methods must be respected. This will be 
checked at run-time in RAC, as in all RAC tools, but also by our static ESC and 
FFV approaches to ensure a consistent handling of these methods. This addresses 
a key problem raised by Chalin [2] where, in the static verification approaches 
associated with JML, the pre-conditions of method calls in specifications were not 
checked. 
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The Omnibus language supports the use of lightweight behaviour specifications 
for RAC and ESC and heavyweight behaviour specifications for FFV. There is no 
formally quantifiable difference between lightweight and heavyweight 
specifications. The difference is in the mindset of the writer.  When writing a 
heavyweight specification the developer should attempt to describe the interface 
of the component as completely as possible with the assertion language. This will 
typically involve the use of quantifiers and recursion. When using lightweight 
specifications, practical concerns must be kept at the forefront of the developer’s 
thinking in order to keep run-time checking overheads down or theorem proving 
difficulty within the scope of automated proving. This will require constructs such 
as quantifiers and recursion to be used sparingly. The completeness of post-
conditions and frame-conditions can be compromised but, even in lightweight 
specifications, the pre-conditions should be described as completely as possible so 
that it is always possible to identify when a method call is invalid. 
Requirements specifications: The requirements of a class are specified using 
initially, invariant, and constraint assertions. The initially 
assertions should hold over all freshly constructed objects, invariant assertions 
should hold over objects whenever they are accessible by code in other classes 
and constraint assertions should hold across any operation calls. 
Implementations: The implementation of the class is defined in terms of method 
implementations that manipulate the values of the private attributes. Each of the 
model functions must be described at the private level in terms of the attributes. 
Loops can be annotated with loop invariant assertions. 
Libraries: Like JML, Omnibus hides mathematical abstractions like sequences 
and sets behind a façade of library classes. Users interact with these classes 
through methods just like any other class, and do not need to learn additional 
mathematical notation to manipulate them. For example, the arrays, lists and 
comparators in our main example are all expressed as Omnibus classes. 
3. Combining assertion-based verification 
approaches 
In this section we show why it is useful to use the approaches together in an 
integrated fashion. We start by selecting one approach, ESC, and discuss some of 
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the reasons why it has been relatively well received. We then illustrate a key flaw 
in the approach and show how the other approaches help address it. 
3.1 Strengths of ESC 
The ESC approach provides a push-button technique to statically detect a range of 
possible run-time errors and violations of lightweight specifications. It provides 
better error coverage than conventional type checking, and allows problems to be 
uncovered earlier in the software development cycle than RAC when they are 
cheaper to correct, without the need to use testing. Furthermore, it requires 
considerably less effort to use than FFV. 
ESC tools feel like type checkers to use, producing type checker-like error 
messages that developers are generally more receptive to than traditional formal 
methods. The approach uses lightweight interface specifications that allow design 
decisions to be documented and warns of inconsistencies between these 
annotations and the code. While appearing like type checkers to the user, the 
implementations of ESC tools have more in common with traditional formal 
verification tools, utilizing fully automated theorem provers behind the scenes. 
The approach is neither sound (so it can miss errors) nor complete (so it can report 
spurious warnings) but is relatively easy to use, fast and powerful. ESC has been 
relatively well received [10] and appears to hold great promise. 
3.2 A Problem with ESC 
There is, however, a critical problem with ESC: the lightweight specifications 
developed while using ESC to check a particular class may not be sufficient as a 
basis for later static modular checking of classes that use this class. In this section 
we will illustrate this problem by presenting an example, showing how the ESC 
approach is used to the point where it breaks down, show the facilities ESC 
provides for coping with this situation and then investigate how RAC and FFV 
handle the problem. 
When applying ESC to a particular class, the process typically starts by taking an 
unannotated or partially annotated piece of code and using an ESC tool to check 
for errors. This will usually yield a number of warnings indicating a combination 
of bugs in the code and incompleteness in the specifications of the current class or 
a class it uses. The user will then enter into a cycle of correcting code and adding 
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annotations to address the issues raised until the tool processes the class without 
warnings. 
Consider the following Omnibus example adapted from the classic example 
presented in the founding paper on ESC/Java [7]. It represents a Bag class which 
is constructed from a List of elements of which the minimums can subsequently 
be removed, in turn, using the extractMin operation. Comparisons are carried 
out using a passed Comparator object. An Array is used to store the elements, 
with the first size positions in the array arr containing the elements currently in 
the Bag. The constructor copies all the elements from the passed List into the 
Array and sets size to the size of the passed List. The extractMin operation 
calculates the index and value of the minimum element and then copies the last 
element in the Array to that index, reduces the size by one and returns the 
minimum element. We will add annotations later as needed to respond to errors 
reported by our ESC tool.  
 1: public class Bag[Element] { 
 2:  private attribute arr:Array[Element] 
 3:  private attribute size:integer 
 4:  private attribute comparer:Comparator[Element] 
 5: 
 6:  public constructor containing 
 7:          (input:List[Element], 
 8:       comp:Comparator[Element])  { 
 9:   comparer := comp; 
10:   size := input.size(); 
11:   arr := Array[Element].ofSize(size); 
12:   var i:integer := 0; 
13:   foreach (e:Element in input) { 
14:    arr.assign(i, e); 
15:    i := i + 1; 
16:   } 
17:  } 
18:  
19:  public operation extractMin(out min:Element) { 
20:   var minIndex:integer := 0; 
21:   min := arr.access(0); 
22:   for (i:integer := 1 to size-1) { 
23:    if (comparer.compare(arr.access(i), 
24:           min).isBefore()) { 
25:     minIndex := i; 
26:     min := arr.access(i); 
27:    } 
28:   } 
29:   size := size - 1; 
30:   arr.assign(minIndex, arr.access(size)); 
31:  } 
32: } 
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Applying ESC to this example using our Omnibus IDE verification tool yields the 
following warnings: 
Bag.obs:21: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
access function declared in omni.lang.Array at line 6 
Bag.obs:21: Unable to verify 'arr.access(0)' is not null 
Bag.obs:23: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
access function declared in omni.lang.Array at line 6 
Bag.obs:23: Unable to verify 'arr.access(i)' is not null 
Bag.obs:30: Unable to verify public requires clause of the 
access function declared in omni.lang.Array at line 6 
These warnings expose undocumented design decisions. For example, the first of 
the errors at line 23 warns that i may not be a valid index of the arr array. We 
know from the loop condition that to reach these lines i must be less than or equal 
to size-1 but there is no known connection between size and arr.length() 
and so we cannot tell whether i < arr.length(). The reader may argue that 
the implementation of the constructor together with the implementation of the 
extractMin operation should be sufficient to deduce this but our ESC tool uses 
modular checking of methods. When reasoning about the extractMin operation, 
it can reason about the other methods in the class using only their specifications. 
The developers of the ESC/Java tool adopt the same position since modular 
checking is essential if the approach is to scale [7]. 
In order to get the Omnibus ESC tool to accept the Bag class we need to add the 
following invariants to formalize the intended relationship between size and 
arr, and a pre-condition that the Bag must be non-empty before extractMin 
can be used. The invariants must be established by the end of the body of the 
containing constructor, can be assumed at the start of the extractMin 
operation and must be re-established by the end of the body of extractMin. To 
describe the pre-condition of extractMin we need to make the size of the Bag 
publicly accessible by introducing a new public function to return it. 
private invariant size >= 0 && size <= arr.length() 
private invariant forall (i:integer := 0 to size-1): 
     arr.access(i) != null 
public model function size():integer 
 private returns size 
public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
These alterations permit the code to pass the checks performed by our ESC tool 
and so the user can move on to another class. Consider the IntegerSorter class 
shown below which uses an instance of the Bag class to sort a List of integers. It 
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starts by constructing a Bag from the passed List and an initially empty List 
named sortedInts into which the sorted values will be put. It then repeatedly 
extracts the minimum from the Bag, adds it to the List until the Bag is empty at 
which point it returns the sortedInts. The function contains an ensures clause 
asserting that the sortedInts list is of the same size as the input list. 
 1: public class IntegerSorter { 
 2:  public static function sort 
 3:            (ints:List[Integer]) 
 4:       :List[Integer] 
 5:    ensures result.size() = ints.size() { 
 6:   var b:Bag[Integer]  
 7:    := Bag[Integer].containing(ints,  
 8:     DefaultIntegerComparator.init()); 
 9:   var sortedInts:List[Integer]  
10:    := List[Integer].empty(); 
11:   while (b.size() > 0) { 
12:    var m:integer; 
13:    b.extractMin(out m); 
14:    sortedInts.add(m); 
15:   } 
16:   return sortedInts; 
17:  } 
18: } 
Applying ESC to this example yields the following warning: 
IntegerSorter.obs:16: Unable to verify public ensures 
clause of sort function declared at line 5 holds at return 
statement 
The tool is unable to deduce that the size of the returned List is equal to the size 
of the passed List. This is because the specification of the Bag class does not 
explain how the containing constructor and extractMin operation alter the 
size of the Bag. Once again, this is a product of the fact that, in the modular 
checking process, methods can only reason about other methods using their 
specifications. 
We have now hit the problem: the lightweight specification we developed through 
verification of the Bag class is insufficient as a basis for the modular checking of 
our new class IntegerSorter. 
In ESC there are two techniques we can use to cope with this eventuality: 
1. iteratively increase the detail of the original specification or  
2. use assumption constructs. 
Iteratively increasing the detail of the original specification: The first and most 
obvious approach is to return to our Bag specification and add to the specification 
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the details the tool needs to verify the new class. In this case, we simply need to 
describe how the containing constructor and extractMin operation change 
the size of the Bag. This is made easier by the fact that we have already defined 
a public size function. Hence we can alter the headers of containing and 
extractMin in our Bag class to be: 
public constructor containing(input:List[Element], 
        comp:Comparator[Element]) 
 ensures size() = input.size() 
 
public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
 ensures size() = old size() - 1 
With these additional annotations, the ESC tool is able to successfully deduce that 
the sizes of the input and returned lists in the IntegerSorter.sort method are 
equal. 
While this has solved the original problem, there is still a host of related problems 
lying in wait. The problem was triggered by the ensures clause of the 
IntegerSorter.sort method which stated that the sizes of the source List 
and the sorted List should be equal. Of course, we might want to more 
completely characterize this method. For example, the entries in the result should 
be ordered and result should be a permutation of the input. If we wanted to 
include such things in the ensures clause of IntegerSorter.sort then we 
would need to further augment the Bag specification to describe how the contents 
are manipulated and how the values returned relate to them. 
This approach assumes that the users of the tool are developing the classes being 
analysed themselves or at least have access to the original source code in order to 
deduce and add assertion annotations. However, this may not always be the case. 
Realistic applications are made up of code written specifically for the application 
being developed, components reused from built-in libraries and possibly 
components produced by third-party component vendors. If the specifications of 
the external components (i.e. the components developed by others) are insufficient 
as a basis for the modular checking then iteratively increasing the detail of the 
specification in this way is not an option. 
A variation of this technique could be used for external components where 
specifications are provided “out-of-band” i.e. separately from the component [1]. 
So whereas the client may not have access to the inner details of the external 
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component, they do have read/write access to the specification of the component. 
However, without access to the original code, they have no way of determining 
the subtleties of exactly how the implementation handles different circumstances 
and no way of checking their best guesses. 
Use of assumption constructs: The other major technique which we can use to 
get around this problem in ESC is to make use of assumption constructs. One such 
assumption construct is the assume statement which permits the user to give an 
assertion to be added to the system’s current knowledge without further 
justification. So, for example, when we found that the specification of the Bag 
class was insufficient to verify that the sizes of the input List and sorted List 
are equal, we could simply have added an assume statement to say that they 
should be. Such a statement could be placed just before the return statement and 
would appear as follows: 
15a: assume sortedInts.size() = ints.size(); 
This would then enable the system to deduce the truth of the ensures clause at 
the end of the method. 
The problem with assumption constructs is obvious: they are, as their name 
implies, assumptions without formal justification within the system. They are 
unsound and allow the user to circumnavigate the entire checking process. 
However, they do allow the user to suppress spurious warnings and can be used in 
conjunction with external components as well as pieces of code written by the 
developers themselves. Furthermore, while there is no basis for the assumptions 
within the system, the user can base them upon informal information such as the 
names of the class and methods, associated interface documentation and domain 
information. They can then include descriptions of informal justification as 
comments within the code. We will also see how they can be used in conjunction 
with RAC. 
3.3 Plugging the gaps in ESC with RAC and FFV 
Let us now consider how the other approaches can help address this problem. 
Incorporating RAC: RAC is another approach that we can use to verify the 
correctness of an application relative to lightweight specifications. We can take 
our Bag and IntegerSorter classes with their specifications, generate an 
implementation incorporating run-time assertion checks and then test it to detect 
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failures. The key advantage of RAC in tackling this problem is that while in ESC 
the specification of a class forms the sole basis for verification of its use in classes 
that use it, in RAC the implementation can be used to check properties that were 
not described by the specification. Taking our example, the incompleteness of the 
lightweight specification of the Bag class would not cause a problem for the 
verification of the IntegerSorter class using RAC. This is because although 
the specification does not explicitly describe how the size changes, the 
implementation does and that is what is used to check assertions in RAC. Another 
way of looking at this is that RAC never gives a warning unless there is a run-time 
error or a violation of an assertion, whereas ESC also reports warnings if the 
specifications are insufficient to perform modular static checking. So RAC 
doesn’t suffer from this crucial limitation although it has its own limitations (like 
the need to be associated with a testing strategy in order to detect assertion 
failures) that prevent it being an ideal replacement. 
We have seen how assumption constructs are a useful way to provide additional 
information about components although they had no formal basis within the ESC 
system and so could be used to circumnavigate the verification process. However, 
while the assumption constructs cannot be verified statically, they can be 
converted into RAC checks. Thus ESC can be used to check everything except the 
assumption constructs and RAC used to check the assumption constructs. This can 
be applied to our IntegerSorter example, the class being verified by the ESC 
tool, assuming that the assume statement holds, something that can then be 
verified by testing the application with its generated RAC run-time checks. This 
technique is used by the Spec# tool [1]. 
Incorporating FFV: Up until this point, we have considered only lightweight 
specifications and approaches. However, an obvious solution to the problem of 
lightweight specifications not providing sufficient information is to write more 
descriptive heavyweight specifications. By using these together with FFV, we can 
get around the problem, since a heavyweight specification can be sufficiently 
informative to provide a basis for static modular checking. However, FFV is too 
costly to form an ideal complete replacement for ESC. 
Let us for the moment restrict our attention to reusable components, i.e. 
components that have been written by another developer, whose source code we 
have no access to and whose specification we have read-only access to. There has 
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been a wide range of work on reusable software components. To safely reuse 
components from external sources we need two things: 
1. specifications that sufficiently describe the interface of the component 
[11], and  
2. sufficient basis to trust that the hidden implementation satisfies the 
specification [13].  
The problem is that ESC does not completely address either of these issues. 
However, FFV can. The heavyweight specifications produced for FFV provide a 
way of sufficiently describing the interface of a component and its associated 
verification approach provides a basis for trusting a hidden implementation. Also, 
while the costs of FFV cannot typically be justified for entire applications, the 
economies of scale make it a more attractive proposition for reusable components. 
So suppose the Bag class was developed by a third-party component vendor. They 
could use FFV to fully specify and verify their component, giving a specification 
with all the information needed to check the IntegerSorter class. An outline of 
a heavyweight specification of the Bag class is given below: 
public class Bag[Element] { 
 private attribute arr:Array[Element] 
 private attribute size:integer 
 private attribute comparer:Comparator[Element] 
 ... 
 public model function contents():List[Element] 
  private returns arr.range(0,size).toList() 
 
 public model function comparer():Comparator[Element] 
  private returns comparer 
 
 public function size():integer 
  returns contents().size() 
 
 public constructor containing 
          (input:List[Element], 
       comp:Comparator[Element]) 
  ensures contents() = input, 
    comparer() = comp 
 { ... } 
 
 public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
  requires size() > 0 
  changes contents 
  ensures old contents().contains(min), 
   forall (e:Element in old contents()): 
    comparer() 
      .compare(min, e).isBeforeOrSame(), 
   forall (e:Element in old contents()): 
    if e = min then 
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     contents().countOf(e)  
     = old contents().countOf(e)– 1 
    else 
     contents().countOf(e) 
     = old contents().countOf(e) 
 { ... } 
} 
If we are verifying the IntegerSorter class using FFV then the tool can use 
this heavyweight specification to reason about the Bag class. However, the ESC 
tool is not able to effectively reason about it because of its use of the recursive 
countOf method. We will look at how we can ESC-check the IntegerSorter 
class using this specification in the next section. 
4. Challenges in using the approaches together 
There are a number of problems that can arise when using the approaches 
together. These occur when, in using a particular approach to verify a class, we 
have to reason about the use of a class that was verified using a different 
approach. In this section we present some guidelines for avoiding conflicts 
between the approaches. We have included “unverified” as a classification of 
verification since the application may contain classes that are not verified with 
any of the approaches and interactions with such classes may be particularly 
troublesome. 
Note that we consider the problems from the point of view of a class using 
another class, where the usage is strictly directed. For example, the 
IntegerSorter class uses the Bag class, but the Bag class does not use the 
IntegerSorter class, so we only consider the problems caused by the 
incompatibilities of the two specifications from the point of view of the 
IntegerSorter class. Of course, it may be possible to have bi-directional usage 
links and where these occur we treat them as two separate usage links.  
4.1 RAC- and ESC-compatibility 
A key problem with combining the different assertion-based verification 
approaches is that not all specifications can be converted to efficient run-time 
checks and handled by the automated provers used by ESC. We refer to these 
properties as RAC- and ESC-compatibility, respectively. 
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RAC-compatibility is the more straightforward to define. Certain specification 
constructs like quantifiers and recursion can cause problems for run-time assertion 
checkers. We can check quantifiers at run-time if their variables are restricted to 
enumerable ranges but, even if we do this, it may not be practical for efficiency 
reasons. Care must also be taken with recursion so as to avoid non-termination (a 
potential source of unsoundness in our approach) and situations where evaluation 
of the assertion describing the intended behaviour of the method is as costly as the 
execution of the method itself. To ensure RAC-compatibility the developer must 
ensure that all specifications that need to be checked at run-time can be converted 
into efficient checks. In the next section we will see that we must consider RAC-
compatibility even when we are using one of the other approaches to verify a 
component. 
The Omnibus tool is able to check whether assertions are executable by ensuring 
they don’t use certain constructs like quantifiers without enumerable ranges. The 
efficiency aspect is trickier. Test harnesses can be used to help assess the 
efficiency but what is acceptable will be dependent on the context. Run-time 
overheads may prevent the use of assertion checks in certain final products, but 
they may still be useful in pre-release testing. 
ESC-compatibility is more complex to define. Firstly, certain constructs like 
recursion typically cannot be handled by automated provers and so are not ESC-
compatible. However, automated provers can run into problems even when using 
specifications that do not use such features. Although quantifiers can usually be 
handled, complicated combinations will often defeat them. Every prover will have 
things that it can handle well and, as a consequence of undecidability of the 
problem, must also have things that it handles poorly. A possible approach is to 
define ESC-compatibility relative to the specific theorem proving capabilities of 
the ESC tool being used. To determine whether a specification is ESC-compatible 
for a particular tool, we must experiment with that tool, and the Omnibus IDE 
supports the definition of test harnesses which can be used to carry out this 
experimentation. A problem with this definition of ESC-compatibility is that it is 
implementation dependent, which will become more of an issue as the community 
moves towards interchangeable provers. 
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4.2 Guidelines for avoiding conflicts when using the 
approaches together 
We have developed a set of guidelines to help developers avoid conflicts between 
the approaches. The automated checking of these guidelines is discussed in 
section 7. 
1. All pre-conditions should be expressed in terms that are compatible with 
all of the approaches. Incompatible pre-conditions should be rewritten 
using new functions. Test harnesses can be used to help check RAC- and 
ESC-compatibility. 
2. All classes should include run-time checks of their pre-conditions unless it 
is absolutely clear that unverified or RAC-verified code will never directly 
use them. 
3. All heavyweight specifications that cannot be handled by ESC should 
provide lightweight ESC-compatible substitutes via redundant 
specifications. ESC-compatibility should be checked using test harnesses. 
4. The system should be structured so that ESC-verified classes never have to 
directly reason about unverified classes and FFV-verified classes never 
have to directly reason about unverified, RAC-verified or ESC-verified 
classes. 
Guideline 1 says that all pre-conditions should be written to be compatible with 
all of the approaches. As was discussed earlier, to establish this we must ensure 
that they are RAC- and ESC-compatible. To do this the developer should attempt 
to write the pre-conditions in a suitable form e.g. avoiding the use of recursion 
and providing enumerable ranges for quantified variables wherever possible, 
allowing them to be converted into run-time checks. However, to sufficiently 
describe the pre-condition of a method, it may be necessary to use assertions that 
cannot be handled by these approaches. 
As a somewhat artificial example, consider the following extract of a Set class 
verified using FFV. The public specifications are described in terms of the 
contains and size public model functions which are implemented using a 
private List attribute named contents. We ensure that contents contains no 
duplicates by using an invariant so that we can calculate the size of the Set by 
taking the size of the contents List and do not need to remove any duplicates 
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first. We define a unionOfDisjoints operation to calculate the union of the set 
with another set. The pre-condition of the unionOfDisjoints operation is 
expressed in terms of the contains model function using a quantifier without an 
enumerable range and thus the system cannot automatically generate an 
appropriate run-time check to guard this method. We may wish to write a 
quantifier to iterate over the contents attribute that is used to implement the 
contains model function but we cannot refer to this private attribute in the 
public specification of unionOfDisjoints. 
public class Set[Element] { 
 private attribute contents:List[Element] 
 
 private invariant "No duplicates in contents": 
  !(exists (i:integer := 0 to contents.size()-1, 
    j:integer := 0 to contents.size()-1): 
   i != j 
   && contents.elementAt(i) 
     = contents.elementAt(j))  
 
 public model function contains(e:Element):boolean 
  private returns contents.contains(e) 
 
 public model function size():integer 




 public operation unionOfDisjoints(s2:Set[Element]) 
  requires "Sets must be disjoint": 
    forall (e:Element): 
     !(this.contains(e) && s2.contains(e)) 
  changes contains 
  ensures 
 contains(e) = old contains(e) || s2.contains(e), 
 size() = old size() + s2.size() 
} 
We can combat this problem by re-writing pre-conditions involving unconstrained 
quantifiers using separate new functions that are described using a method with 
the troublesome assertion in its post-condition and an implementation defining 
how to implement the check. This solves the problem of RAC-compatibility since 
the dynamic checks will use the implementation of the new function to check the 
pre-condition whereas the static approach can use the post-condition of the new 
function described using the unexecutable assertion. What we have exploited here 
is that RAC only requires that the pre-conditions and the implementations of 
called classes can be executed. 
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For example, in the Set class we could introduce an isDisjointTo function 
and define the pre-condition of the unionOfDisjoints operation in terms of it. 
The system will then be able to convert the pre-condition of the 
unionOfDisjoints operation into a run-time check, using the implementation 
of the isDisjointTo function. Run-time checks do not need to be generated for 
the post-conditions in the Set class since the verification of the Set class using 
FFV will prove these, provided that the pre-conditions hold at the start of the 
method (which the run-time checks ensure). The FFV verification of the Set class 
can still reason about the pre-condition of the unionOfDisjoints operation in 
terms of the unconstrained quantifier which now appears in the post-condition of 
the isDisjointTo function. Furthermore, the FFV verification of the Set class 
will require the developer to prove that the isDisjointTo function satisfies its 
post-condition, ensuring that the developer has implemented the check properly. 
 public operation unionOfDisjoints(s2:Set[Element]) 
  requires "Sets must be disjoint": 
    this.isDisjointTo(s2) 
  changes contains 
  ensures 
 contains(e) = old contains(e) || s2.contains(e), 
 size() = old size() + s2.size() 
 { ... } 
 
public function isDisjointTo(s2:Set[Element]):boolean 
  ensures result <==>  
          (forall (e:Element):  
      !(this.contains(e) 
      && s2.contains(e))) 
 { 
  // Check all elements in 'this' are not in 's2' 
  foreach (e:Element in contents) { 
   if (s2.contains(e)) { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
  // Check all elements in 's2' are not in 'this' 
  foreach (e:Element in s2.contents) { 
   if (contains(e)) { 
    return false; 
   } 
  } 
  return true; 
 } 
This approach can also be used to ensure ESC-compatiblity when used in 
conjunction with guideline 3. A new function can be introduced to move a non 
ESC-compatible assertion from the pre-condition of the original method to the 
19 
post-condition of a new method where redundant specifications can be used to 
provide a partial, ESC-compatible description of the method. Additional 
assumptions about the value of the method can then be easily formulated in the 
client code as appropriate. 
Guideline 2 says that all classes should, in general, include dynamic checks of 
their pre-conditions because, while calls made from statically verified code should 
satisfy the pre-conditions, calls from RAC-verified or unverified code may not. 
Hence, ESC- and FFV-verified classes that were verified under the assumption 
that their pre-conditions are always respected, may have that assumption broken. 
This may lead to a run-time error or assertion failure being generated within the 
execution of the statically verified class, even though the cause of the error was 
the silent violation of the pre-condition by the calling class, and not a fault in the 
implementation of the statically verified class. To guard against this we must 
ensure that any methods called by unverified or RAC-verified classes must have 
their pre-conditions checked at run-time so that invalid calls of these methods can 
be identified and reported correctly to the user. If, however, the class being 
considered is for use only within this system and all the classes that use the class 
have been statically checked then, for efficiency reasons, the checks can be 
omitted. 
Guideline 3 says that non ESC-compatible heavyweight ensures clauses should 
have lightweight ESC-compatible redundant specifications. Redundant 
specifications are generally used to express properties that should follow from the 
standard specification. Our idea is that if the post-condition of a method in a FFV-
verified class cannot be handled by ESC, then a redundant specification is 
provided giving a lightweight specification that should follow from the original 
specification but does not have to be complete in any sense. For example, while 
the heavyweight Bag specification in Section 3.3 provides all the information 
necessary to verify our IntegerSorter class, its use of the recursive countOf 
method means the ESC tool cannot effectively deduce that the size of the Bag is 
decreased by one in the extractMin method. We can provide this information in 
a form accessible to the ESC tool via a lightweight redundant specification like 
the one shown below. 
public operation extractMin(out min:Element) 
 requires size() > 0 
 changes contents 
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ensures ... 
which ensures size() = old size() - 1 
In this case, we discovered that the heavyweight Bag specification from section 
3.3 was not ESC-compatible when we attempted to verify the IntegerSorter 
class using ESC. Alternatively we could have written special test harnesses within 
the Bag class to check its ESC-compatibility. 
Now, if we are using FFV to verify the use of a class that was verified using FFV 
then we would use its original heavyweight specification and, if we are using ESC 
to verify the use of a class that was verified using FFV, we would use its 
lightweight redundant specification. Of course, the lightweight redundant 
specifications suffer from the same incompleteness problems as any other 
lightweight specifications. Normally, when using ESC, the lightweight 
specification and the code is all we have and if we don’t have access to the code 
then we have to use assumption constructs based on informal domain knowledge 
or interface documentation. However, in this situation the developer can refer to 
the heavyweight specification in order to determine if assumption constructs are 
valid. These justifications could be informally documented in comments within 
the code or formally verified with FFV. 
In our experience, the majority of methods can be written to be ESC-compatible 
and, for those that cannot, redundant specifications are generally easy to write and 
are useful to verify some desired properties of the specification. 
Guideline 4 describes some combinations of approaches that should be avoided. 
If the entire application has been developed by a single person then it is always 
possible to structure the application so that these combinations are avoided. We 
can achieve this by either increasing the level of verification used for the client 
class or decreasing the level of verification for the supplier class. For example, it 
is not allowable to use FFV to verify the IntegerSorter along with ESC for the 
Bag class but we can either increase the verification of the Bag class to FFV or 
decrease the verification of the IntegerSorter class to ESC. The situation may 
be complicated by the relationships with other classes in the system. For example, 
there may be another class in the system that uses Bag and is also verified using 
FFV in which case we should probably increase the verification of Bag to FFV 
rather than decrease the verification of IntegerSorter to ESC. In the extremes 
we will be forced to increase the verification level of the entire application to be 
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FFV or decrease it to RAC/ESC but, in general, it will be possible to have 
intermediate levels of verification. We will discuss this further in section 5.2. 
While we can always follow guideline 4 if we have developed all the classes in 
the application ourselves, applications will usually make some use of external 
components either from built-in libraries or component vendors. These pose a 
problem since we cannot change their level of verification to fit the verification 
levels of the other classes in our application. Let us suppose that the Bag class is 
an external component. If it was verified using ESC then we are constrained to 
use ESC/RAC to verify the IntegerSorter class. However, if it was verified 
using FFV then, assuming guidelines 1, 2 and 3 are followed, we are free to use 
any one of RAC, ESC or FFV to verify our IntegerSorter class. We view this 
as a sufficient justification to favour the use of FFV for reusable components 
wherever possible [17]. 
The following table enumerates the allowable calling relationships between 
classes verified using the different approaches along with the corresponding 
constraints. This table is read as follows. Suppose, for example, that we wish to 
work out whether, when verifying the IntegerSorter class using ESC, we can 
use a version of the Bag class verified using FFV. To do this, we look up the ESC 
row and FFV column and find we can, providing that non ESC-compatible post-
conditions have lightweight redundant specification substitutes. 
Can use classes verified using 
Approach 
None RAC ESC FFV 
     
Unverified Y Y Y1 Y1 
RAC Y Y Y1 Y1 
ESC N2 Y3,4 Y4 Y5 
FFV N6 N6 N6 Y 
 
Constraints: 
1. Providing that pre-conditions are dynamically checked and don’t contain 
non RAC-compatible constructs like unconstrained quantifiers. 
2. Unless all calls of the methods of this class are guarded by appropriate 
assume and assert statements. This will be cumbersome unless the number 
of calls is small. 
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3. Providing that the specifications are ESC-compatible. 
4. Using assumption constructs or, if the class is not an external component, 
iterative strengthening of specifications to handle incompleteness 
problems. 
5. Providing non ESC-compatible post-conditions have lightweight 
redundant specification substitutes. 
6. Unless the FFV approach is weakened to allow assumptions (as discussed 
in section 6) and all calls of the methods of this class are guarded by 
appropriate assume and assert statements. This will be cumbersome unless 
the number of calls is small. 
5. Recommendations for when to use the different 
approaches 
The preceding section described the ways in which it is possible to use the 
approaches together. It described which combinations are invalid and the 
constraints that the combinations of the other approaches must satisfy in order to 
be valid. However, for realistic systems, there will still be multiple ways in which 
the system could be divided up into sections where different approaches are used. 
While there are no definite rules on how to select a particular verification 
approach for each section, and part of the point of our work is to give the 
developer flexibility to make such choices themselves, we have developed some 
general guidelines to assist the developer. Developers must also be conscious of 
the consequences of their choices of verification approaches for the different 
classes in their application and we also discuss this. 
5.1 General guidelines 
When to use ESC: Our opinion is that ESC, together with dynamic checking of 
assume statements, is the best approach for the majority of classes. We 
recommend the use of ESC unless the class being verified falls into one of the 
categories described below. 
When to use RAC instead of ESC: ESC requires considerable up-front effort in 
order to provide the tool with enough annotations to perform static modular 
checking. Even if a system has no bugs, the ESC tool will keep reporting 
warnings until the developer has provided sufficient assertion annotations. If this 
23 
up-front investment is not practically possible then RAC can be used instead. In 
RAC, the verification effort is carried out in the traditional testing phase. 
When to use FFV instead of ESC: There are two main situations where a 
developer might prefer FFV to ESC: (1) to verify critical classes and (2) to verify 
reusable components. If the cost of an error in the class is very high then the 
developer may decide that the additional error coverage provided by FFV, albeit 
at a considerable cost, make it the most desirable approach. If RAC or ESC is 
used to verify a reusable component then the specifications will likely be 
lightweight and relatively incomplete. This will hamper clients using ESC to 
verify classes that use the component. There may be properties of the component 
that are needed to verify the client’s class that are not expressed in the lightweight 
specification. Assumption constructs will have to be used to address this because 
the source of an external component is not available to be iteratively strengthened. 
This will involve extra work and complicates the use of the components. As a 
result, if RAC or ESC is used to verify a reusable component then it may be better 
to dynamically check usage of the component using RAC rather than using ESC 
since clients using RAC do not need to provide additional assumption constructs 
when using components with lightweight specifications. 
When to use none of the approaches: We strongly recommend that at the very 
least developers use lightweight specifications to document key design decisions 
and RAC to report when they are violated. This involves modest additional effort 
but can greatly assist in debugging and provides a springboard to the use of static 
approaches. 
5.2 Structuring the verification of an application 
The decisions on what verification approaches to use for each class in an 
application cannot be taken in isolation. The verification approach we use to 
verify a class will have repercussions for the classes that use it. The main hard 
requirement is that we cannot use FFV to verify a class unless we have used FFV 
to verify all the classes that it uses. We should also look to avoid using unverified 
classes in ESC verified classes. So, when we use anything other than FFV to 
verify a class, we are restricting the verification of the classes that use it to not be 
FFV and when we do not use any of the approaches we make it difficult to use 
ESC. Thus it is clear, the interactions between the verification approaches for the 
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classes in the application are focussed around the uses relationships and so it may 
be useful to produce a diagramatic overview of an application and its uses 
relationships. We can do this by breaking the application into horizontal levels 
where the classes in each level may be used by those in levels above but not by 
those below. The bottom level will be the built-in libraries which necessarily do 
not use any classes from the application or components from third-party 
component vendors. Above this will be levels for third-party components which 
may use the built-in libraries but not the classes in the application. Similar levels 
should be identified within the application itself. For example, in a Model-View-
Controller (MVC) application, the model classes would be below the views and 
controllers. Figure 1 shows an example of how the verification of an MVC 
application might be structured. This kind of structuring mechanism is also 
consistent with Rushby’s concept of a “safety kernel” [15]. The Model in our 
MVC diagram could be interpreted as a “safety kernel” because of its rigorous 
verification with FFV. 
As was discussed earlier, a software developer has no control over which 
verification approach was used for library components and third-party 
components (shown below the dashed line in the figure). The limits this imposes 
on the other classes are clearly visible in the diagram above. For example, if 
3rd_party_component_1 was verified with RAC instead of FFV, then the 






Figure 1: structuring the verification of an MVC application 
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developer would not be permitted to use FFV for verifying the Model and 
View_3. In order to provide the developer with as much flexibility as possible in 
configuring the verification of their application, we therefore recommend that 
FFV should be used for all third-party components and library components [17]. 
6. Configuring assertion-based verification 
approaches 
In this section we will discuss some ways in which the dynamic and static 
checking can be configured. Dynamic checking corresponds to RAC while static 
checking encompasses ESC and FFV. 
6.1 Configuring dynamic checking 
There are a number of ways in which the dynamic checking process, whereby 
assertion annotations are converted into run-time checks, can be customized. The 
most basic customization is the range of checks to perform. The developer may 
decide that they only want to dynamically check certain types of assertions. The 
case discussed earlier where only assume statements are checked dynamically is 
a good example. Another example would be reducing the number of checks in 
order to decrease the time overhead. 
It may also be useful to customize the information contained in the assertion 
failure reports. There is a trade-off between the level of information in the failure 
messages and run-time efficiency of the compiled executable. By default, the user 
may want to include just basic information like a description of the failure, the 
relevant source code and a stack trace. However, if the information in these 
messages is not sufficient to pinpoint the exact circumstances of a failure then 
they may prefer to generate more comprehensive error reports including current 
parameter, attribute and local variable values at the point of failure and detailed 
information on the execution path (e.g. how many times was each loop executed). 
There are a number of constructs in the Omnibus assertion language which are not 
always convertible into efficient run-time checks (e.g. quantifiers) and others that 
are never convertible into run-time checks (e.g. iterate assertions which are 
beyond the scope of this paper). Some quantifier expressions can be converted 
into run-time checks, e.g. those using only variable declarations associated with a 
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range of integer values, but those without such restrictions cannot be. Even those 
that can be converted into run-time checks will likely be expensive to check. The 
developer may want the system to either ignore (i.e. treat as ‘true’) or prohibit (i.e. 
generate a type checking error if found) quantifiers that cannot be dynamically 
checked and may want to ignore or translate quantifiers that can be dynamically 
checked. 
6.2 Configuring static checking 
Omnibus provides support for both the ESC and FFV static verification 
approaches. These are distinct approaches with different aims but the underlying 
processes they use are strikingly similar. They are both used in conjunction with a 
theorem prover and start by translating the specifications of the classes and 
methods used in the application into the logic of the corresponding prover and 
then generate a range of Verification Conditions (VCs) over these specifications 
which should be valid if the program is free of the class of errors being checked. 
The most immediately apparent difference is that ESC uses relatively lightweight 
specifications whereas FFV requires relatively heavyweight specifications. ESC 
also makes a range of compromises in soundness in order to make the approach 
easier to use. Loops are analysed by unraveling them a finite number of times, 
instead of requiring loop invariants and proving them inductively. Assumption 
constructs are permitted to help tackle the incompleteness of the lightweight 
specifications and automated prover. ESC always uses an automated prover 
whereas FFV can use either automated or interactive provers. Finally, ESC is a 
code-centric approach where all verification involves analysis of code, whereas in 
FFV it is possible to analyse the consistency of specifications independent of any 
implementation. 
As with dynamic checking, the most basic customization is the range of checks 
that should be performed. The user may want to statically check only certain kinds 
of assertions. They may also want to verify requirements such as invariants in 
different ways. Either the behaviour specifications should imply them (our FFV 
approach) or the implementation should (the ESC approach). 
The next most fundamental way in which static checking can be configured is in 
the choice of theorem prover. Currently our system supports the use of the fully 
automated Simplify prover [5] and the interactive PVS prover [14]. Which prover 
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is appropriate is dependent on the skills of the available users and the complexity 
of the required proof. The selection of the prover has repercussions for other 
customizations, mainly the handling of certain heavyweight constructs that the 
PVS prover can handle but which Simplify can’t. 
The other major configurable options are concerned with the soundness of the 
process. Firstly, users can specify whether loops are required to have loop 
invariants provided. If the approach is to be sound then it must. In this case, a type 
checking error will be generated if a loop without an invariant is found. 
Otherwise, if a loop invariant is not provided, the loop will be analysed by 
unraveling it up to a finite number of times that can be configured by the user 
(defaulting to 1). Secondly, users can specify whether assumption constructs are 
permitted. If the approach is to be sound it should not permit these. 
As with dynamic checking, a number of constructs from the assertion language 
may cause problems and so it may be useful to specify special handling for them. 
Recursion can cause the Simplify prover to either enter into an infinite loop or 
crash and can be difficult to manage even in the PVS prover. As such, the user 
may want to disallow its use in assertions, use redundant specifications in its place 
or ignore it. 
6.3 Creating new approaches 
Through this configuration process, we can create new approaches that combine 
aspects of the traditional approaches. For example, we could develop different 
configurations for: (i) FFV, but with the loop unraveling technique from ESC to 
avoid the need for loop invariants; (ii) ESC and FFV with and without dynamic 
pre-condition checks; (iii) ESC with and without assume statements dynamically 
checked; (iv) RAC with different levels of failure reports. 
7. Verification Policy Manager 
The Omnibus Integrated Development Environment (IDE) supports static 
verification using fully-automated and interactive theorem provers and the 
generation of bytecode implementations with assertion checks. Thus, it can be 
used to support RAC, ESC and FFV. 
The tool manages these facilities through the concept of verification policies. A 
verification policy defines precisely how to manage the verification of the 
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assertion-annotations in a class. This consists of whether to use dynamic and/or 
static checking, what checks to generate, the theorem prover to use and various 
other configuration options. RAC, ESC and FFV are the initial verification 
policies but the user is also free to combine aspects of the different approaches to 
create new policies. The policies form a hierarchy with each policy being based 
on another policy with possibly some changes. 
There are three main tools that allow the developer to use policies within 
Omnibus: the Policy Manager, the Policy Editor and the Policy Selector. The 
Policy Manager provides a high-level tool for managing verification policies. It 
displays all the policies currently loaded into the system and provides options to 
delete them, extend them to create new policies and edit them. Creation and 
editing of policies is achieved through the Policy Editor, a dialog allowing the 
developer to completely configure a particular policy. Finally, when a project is 
opened, a window is loaded allowing, among other things, the verification policy 
to use when verifying each file in the project to be specified. A screenshot 
showing these tools is shown. 
 
We are also developing Policy Analyser and Policy Integration Checker tools to 
assist in the proper definition and use of verification policies. The purpose of our 
Policy Analyser tool is to ensure that the policies which users define describe the 
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verification process they desire. It will do this by checking how a policy uses 
static and dynamic checks together and displaying a summary advising of things 
such as: the soundness of the policy, how it interacts with other policies and its 
dependence on testing for the verification of the assertion annotations. 
For example, a policy defining the conventional ‘ESC’ approach would be 
deemed unsound because of its allowance of assumption constructs and the use of 
the loop unraveling technique, the user would be warned that because the pre-
conditions of methods are not dynamically checked that they may be violated by 
callers, and no dependence on testing would be reported. If the policy was 
adjusted to require loop invariants for all loops and dynamically check assumption 
constructs and pre-conditions then the policy would be deemed sound, but with a 
dependence on testing to check the assumption constructs. 
We are also developing a Policy Integration Checker tool, which will check the 
structuring of the verification of a project for compliance with the guidelines of 
Section 4.3. Guidelines 2 and 4 are concerned with the policy settings of a project 
and the uses relationships between the classes in the project. The policy settings 
for each file in a project can be retrieved from the Policy Selector and the uses 
relationships can be calculated during the type checking of the project. 
Compliance with guideline 2 within a project can be checked by ensuring that 
policies used for statically verified files have the ‘Generate run-time pre-condition 
checks’ setting enabled unless they are only called from other classes in the 
project that are statically verified. Compliance with guideline 4 can be similarly 
checked by examining the uses relationships and policy settings. 
The above approach checks the guidelines in a non-modular fashion within the 
closed environment of the enclosing project. However, the classes in a project 
may be reused in other projects in a way which violates guideline 2 and, in our 
system, the burden is on the supplier of the component to build in those checks. 
Run-time pre-condition checks should be generated if a class may be reused 
within some other project by classes that are RAC-verified or unverified, even if 
there are no such classes that use it in the current project. To widen the checking 
to include checks for reuse across projects it would be useful to have some 
mechanism for differentiating classes that are intended for reuse by other projects 
from classes not intended to be reused. The system could then check for 
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compliance with guideline 2 in the presence of reuse by checking that all classes 
intended for reuse also have their pre-conditions checked at run-time. 
Guideline 4 does not suffer from the same problem since, as described in section 
5.2, in that guideline the burden is on the user of an external component to 
structure the verification of their classes around the verification approach used for 
the component. 
The other main challenge in checking the guidelines is the need for an assessment 
of the RAC- and ESC-compatibility of assertions in the checking of guidelines 1 
and 3. Guideline 1 states that all pre-conditions should be RAC- and ESC-
compatible and guideline 3 states that post-conditions should have lightweight 
substitutes if they are not ESC-compatible. As we discussed in section 4.1, RAC- 
and ESC-compatibility are difficult to define in terms of simple, checkable rules. 
We can, however, provide limited automated checking by ensuring the absence of 
certain constructs, like recursion and quantifiers without enumerated ranges, 
which are not RAC-/ESC-compatible. Developers can check RAC-/ESC-
compatibility more rigorously through the independent use of test harnesses to 
check the efficiency of RAC-checks and the ability of the ESC-prover to verify 
properties of the specifications. However, the concepts are unavoidably context-
dependent and, using our definition, impossible to assess statically in a modular 
fashion, taking account of all possible usage contexts. 
8. Related Work 
Earlier publications from the JML group hinted at using the approaches together. 
In [8], Jacobs et al. proposed using ESC to guide the selective application of FFV. 
The idea is to first apply ESC to the entire project verifying much of it, and then 
to use interactive FFV to attempt to verify the remainder. In [3], Cok and Kiniry 
discussed how beneficial they thought it would be to have an integration of tools 
that support JML, but as of yet there is no tool support for this. 
Other tools have combined static and dynamic checking to some extent. Spec# [1] 
uses a combination of static and dynamic techniques to verify its assertion 
annotations. They exploit the fact that constructs that are difficult to check 
statically are often relatively easy to check dynamically and vice versa. Their 
approach, however, uses a combination of static and dynamic checking to support 
their single form of verification whereas we offer a range of verification 
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approaches of varying rigour. Other tools like PerfectDeveloper [4] include 
provisions to generate RAC pre-condition checks to ensure that the assumptions 
on which the proofs of correctness are made are not violated by calls made from 
unverified code. 
9. Conclusions and future work 
We started this paper by presenting the case for using the approaches together. We 
selected ESC, which we consider to be the most promising approach, as our 
starting point. It provides better coverage than conventional type checking, allows 
errors to be detected earlier in the software development lifecycle than RAC and 
requires considerably less effort to use than FFV. We then demonstrated a 
situation where ESC breaks down and showed how the use of RAC and FFV can 
assist in that situation. Next we highlighted some key challenges in using the 
approaches together and put forward a set of guidelines to help users of our tool 
avoid them. These guidelines incorporated an explanation of how pre-conditions 
containing constructs such as unconstrained quantifiers can be dynamically 
checked and the presentation of a technique we have developed to use redundant 
specifications to provide lightweight substitutes for specifications containing non 
ESC-compatible constructs. We then described a number of useful ways in which 
the approaches themselves could be configured. In the final sections we outlined 
the support our tool offers for the use of these approaches together and explained 
that currently ours is the only system that provides such tool support. 
The project is continuing on a number of fronts. Work on the language is 
currently focusing on the addition of support for reference semantics in a 
structured manner that is amenable to modular verification. Our existing language 
is built around value semantics. We have found that this is extremely good for the 
specification of modelling types (as is used in JML) but can lead to poor 
modularity in larger applications, requiring that objects are organised in trees. 
Reference semantics can support better modularity but requires some form of 
ownership mechanism (e.g. [6]) in order to be verifiable in a modular manner. 
Unfortunately ownership mechanisms work by imposing a structure like that from 
value semantics and so are vulnerable to the same structuring problems. While 
noting recent advances in this area [6], we see the problem of developing a 
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modular but flexible ownership mechansim for reference semantics as an 
important open research challenge. 
Work on the IDE is currently focused on the Verification Tracker tool which can 
be used to view the details and status of the verification of a project. The tool 
tracks the testing of the generated run-time checks and gives details of the 
generated VCs together with information on whether they have been 
automatically or interactively proved. We are also investigating the use of 
different theorem provers. 
We have developed a number of small and medium-sized case studies using 
Omnibus. The next step for the ideas presented in this paper is to develop larger 
case studies to explore how they operate in a commercial setting. 
When using different verification approaches together it is important to ensure 
that the approaches use consistent interpretations of the language. This has been 
an issue in the JML community where tools have been developed by different 
groups who have made different choices about certain semantic issues [2]. All the 
Omnibus tools are developed by our group and we have made every effort to 
ensure the consistency of the interpretation of the language for our static and 
dynamic verification tools. This consistency has not, however, been formally 
demonstrated. Similarly, we have not yet formally demonstrated the soundness of 
our guidelines. 
A theme in our work is the provision of a spectrum of tools to support verification 
at different levels of rigour, depending on the reliability requirements of the 
project and the skills of the developers. We believe most software developers 
need push-button verification tools, while component vendors should use full 
formal verification to fully describe their component and provide certification of 
the correctness of the hidden implementation. This idea is discussed in more detail 
in [17]. 
We are also working on a range of facilities to support software component reuse. 
These include support for the generation of comprehensive interface 
documentation from specifications, a framework for the certification of 
components and integrated support for the location and distribution of 
components. 
33 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful for the valuable feedback from the 
anonymous reviewers and the attendees and organisers of the SEFM 2005 
conference. 
References 
1. M. Barnett, K.R.M. Leino, W. Schulte – “The Spec# programming system:  An overview”, 
Proceedings of CASSIS 2004, Springer LNCS 3362, 2004. 
2. P Chalin – “Logical Foundations of Program Assertions: What do Practitioners Want?”, 
Proceedings of SEFM 2005, IEEE Computer Society, 2004. 
3. D.R. Cok, J.R. Kiniry – “ESC/Java2: Uniting ESC/Java and JML: Progress and issues in building 
and using ESC/Java2”, NIII technical report R0413, 2004. 
4. D. Crocker – “Safe Object-Oriented Software: the Verified Design-by-Contract paradigm”, Procs. 
of the 12th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Springer-Verlag, 2004. 
5. D. Detlefs, G. Nelson, J.B. Saxe – “Simplify: A theorem prover for program checking”, Technical 
Report HPL-2003-148, HP Labs, 2003. 
6. W. Dietl, P. Müller – “Universes: Lightweight ownership for JML”, Journal of Object Technology 
(JOT), 4(8), 2005. 
7. C. Flanagan, K.R.M. Leino, M. Lillibridge, G. Nelson, J.B. Saxe, R.Stata – “Extended static 
checking for Java”, Proceedings of PLDI 2002, ACM SIGPLAN Notices 37(5), 2002. 
8. B. Jacobs, C. Marché, N. Rauch – “Formal verification of a commercial smart card applet with 
multiple tools”, Proceedings of AMAST 2004, Springer LNCS 3116, 2004. 
9. G.T. Leavens, A.L. Baker, C. Ruby – “Preliminary Design of JML: A Behavioral Interface 
Specification Language for Java”, Dept. of Computer Science, Iowa State University, TR #98-06p, 
2003. 
10. K.R.M. Leino – “Extended Static Checking: A Ten-Year Perspective”, Informatics—10 Years 
Back, 10 Years Ahead, Springer LNCS 2000, 2001. 
11. B. Meyer – “Contracts for components”, Software Development Magazine, July 2000. 
12. B. Meyer – “Eiffel: The Language”, ISBN 0132479257, Prentice Hall, 2000. 
13. B. Meyer – “On to components”, IEEE Computer, January 1999. 
14. S. Owre, S. Rajan, J.M. Rushby, N. Shankar, M.K. Srivas – “PVS: Combining Specification, Proof 
Checking, and Model Checking”, Proceedings of CAV 1996, Springer LNCS 1102, 1996. 
15. J. Rushby – “Kernels for safety? ”, Safe and Secure Computing Systems, Blackwell. Scientific 
Publications, 1989. 
16. T. Wilson – Omnibus home page. Available at http://www.cs.stir.ac.uk/omnibus/, 2007. 
17. T. Wilson, S. Maharaj, R.G. Clark – “Push-button tools for software developers, full formal 
verification for component vendors”, Technical Report CSM-167, Dept. of Computing Science and 
Mathematics, University of Stirling, 2006 
18. T. Wilson, S. Maharaj, R.G. Clark – “Omnibus: a clean language and supporting tool for 
integrating different assertion-based verification techniques ”, Proceedings of the Workshop on 
Rigorous Engineering of Fault Tolerant Systems (REFT), 2005 
19. T. Wilson, S. Maharaj, R.G. Clark - “Omnibus Verification Policies: a flexible, configurable 
approach to assertion-based software verification”, Proceedings of SEFM 2005, IEEE Computer 
Society, 2005. 
